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The age of the applied economist: the transformation of 
economics since the 1970s 
 
Roger E. Backhouse and Béatrice Cherrier 
reb@bhouse.org.uk and beatrice.cherrier@gmail.com  
 
1. The problem1 
 
The twenty-first century is the age of the applied economist. Applied work dominates the top 
economics journals. Citations of ten out of the last twelve John Bates Clark Medal winners 
describe the recipients as being “applied”, “empirical” or as doing work of “practical 
relevance.” Summarizing his experience of PhD students applying for jobs at Princeton, 
Angus Deaton (2007) has written: 
 
If the typical thesis of the eighties was an elaborate piece of price 
theory estimated by non-linear maximum likelihood on a very small 
number of observations, the typical thesis of today uses little or no 
theory, much simpler econometrics, and hundreds of thousands of 
observations (The amount of computing time has remained more or less 
constant). 
 
 
1 We are grateful to all participants into the 2016 History of Political Economy conference for extensive 
discussion and comments on various stages of the paper and for being willing to participate in this project, to 
members of the HOPE Center, Duke University, for allowing us to organize the conference from which this 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2868144 
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The empirical practices in which economists are now engaged include not only traditional 
econometric work but also laboratory experiments, randomized control trials, analysis of 
natural experiments and the building of databases that can be used in different ways. 
Economists who work in government, central banks and international organizations such as 
the World Bank, play a significant role in the discipline. The frontiers between the academic 
world and IT firms such as Google and Microsoft are increasingly porous. This is in dramatic 
contrast to the situation half a century ago when distinguished economists were complaining 
about the propensity of economists to develop elaborate economic theories giving no thought 
to their applicability to the world. For example, Wassily Leontief (1971, p. 1) complained 
that “the weak and all too slowly growing empirical foundation clearly cannot support the 
proliferating superstructure of pure, or should I say, speculative economic theory.” A 
common criticism was that, rather than engaging with the real world, economists typically 
made assumptions that were enabled them to draw their preferred conclusions.2 There are 
still grounds on which to criticize economics, but such charges would be much more difficult 
to substantiate today. There has been a remarkable transformation that historians have so far 
not investigated. 
The transformation of economics that took place in the last decades of the twentieth 
century has increasingly been calling an “empirical turn” (for example Einav and Levin 2014, 
p. 716; Rodrik 2015, p. 201; Offer and Soderberg 2016, p. 13, 56, 277).3 The argument 
typically follows a standard form. Data compiled by Daniel Hamermesh (2013), reproduced 
in Table 1 below, are used to argue that since the 1980s there has been an enormous growth 
in empirical research and a decline in theoretical research. The argument is then made that 
                                                                                                                                                  
volume is derived possible. We owe a special debt to Paul Dudenhefer and Steve Medema.  
2 For a catalog of such criticisms, and a response, see Heller 1975. 
3 This terminology is even more frequent in blogs, including https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-
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this transformation has been enabled by computerization and new, more abundant and better 
data. On this basis, the conclusions such as “the death of theory” or at least a “paradigm 
shift” are announced.4 The result is a straightforward causal story. 
 
Figure 1: Methodology of articles published in American Economic 
Review, Journal of Political Economy and Quarterly Journal of 
Economics . 
 
 
Year Theory Theory with simulation 
Empirical: 
borrowed data 
Empirical: 
own data Experiment 
1963 50.7 1.5 39.1 8.7 0 
1973  54.6 4.2 37.0 4.2 0 
1983  57.6 4.0 35.2 2.4 0.8 
1993  32.4 7.3 47.8 8.8 3.7 
2003  28.9 11.1 38.5 17.8 3.7 
2011  19.1 8.8 29.9 34 8.2 
Source: Hamermesh 2013, Table 4, p. 168. 
 
However, caution is required, for Hamermesh’s data does not show that there is more 
empirical work in economics: it shows that there has been a turn towards empirical work in 
three of the top journals: that empirical work has become more prestigious. Of course, there 
may well be more empirical work, if only because there are more journals and other 
publication outlets and improvements in information technology have dramatically reduced 
the costs of data analysis, but this is not what Hamermesh’s data shows. It is important to 
recall that economics has nurtured a strong tradition in empirical work since at least the 
                                                                                                                                                  
08-25/data-geeks-are-taking-over-economics or http://blog.francetvinfo.fr/classe-eco/2016/09/18/2888.html . 
4 
  For example http://evonomics.com/economic-theory-is-dead-heres-what-will-replace-it/ 
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beginning of the twentieth century, much of it being published outside the major journals. It 
is enough to mention fields such as agricultural economics (important in the early history of 
econometrics), business cycle theory (Wesley Clair Mitchell and the NBER (National Bureau 
of Economic Research)), labor economics, and industrial economics, in all of which 
empirical work was very strong.5 New techniques such as national accounting, cost-of-living 
indexes, input-output analysis, cost benefit analysis, and finance have involved both the 
development of new concepts and tools and also large projects aimed at gathering, recording 
and making sense of data.6 Sometimes the results of such research were published in the 
leading journals but often they were published in books (for example, the numerous volumes 
of empirical work published by the NBER and the Brookings Institution), journals published 
by central banks, commercial banks, and international organizations such as the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank. 
Neither does Hamermesh’s table show that theory is dying. Making such a case 
requires tracing the growth of the number of empirical papers where a theoretical framework 
is altogether absent. Hamermesh and Jeff Biddle (this volume) have done this. They highlight 
an interesting trend. In the 1970s, a large proportion of microeconomic empirical papers 
relied a theoretical framework.7 Since then there has been a limited but significant resurgence 
of atheoretical works in the 2000s, but this has not yet matched the proportion of atheoretical 
papers published in the 1950s.8 Three conclusions would appear to follow: 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
 or http://bruegel.org/2015/06/the-empirical-shift-in-economics/ . 
5 Much interwar economics was “Institutionalist.” Institutionalist economics was heavily empirical being 
dominated by a commitment to be scientific, where being scientific meant both being realistic and developing 
ideas that could be used for social control (see Rutherford 2011, pp. 22-7; Rutherford 1999). 
6 On national accounting, see Vanoli, 2005, Mitra-Khan 2011 and Hirschman 2016 among others. On cost-of-
living indexes, see Stapleford 2009.  
7 This agrees with the findings of Stafford 1986 in the context of labor economics. 
8 It is worth noting that at the level of teaching, whether at undergraduate or graduate level, economics remains 
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1. The period when theory, as that term is now understood, dominated empirical work, 
which lasted for perhaps 30 years, was an exceptional interlude.9 
A previous History of Political Economy supplement (Morgan and Rutherford 1998) told the 
story of how a pluralist economics in which institutionalists’ use of any sources of data that 
could aid policy relevance flourished was pushed aside by neoclassical economics. Though 
Morgan and Rutherford chose, entirely legitimately, to focus on the demise of pluralism, their 
story could have been told as being about the rise of theory, for it was during this period that 
economic theory—increasingly understood as mathematical modeling involving the analysis 
of utility-maximizing households and profit-maximizing firms, usually operating in 
competitive markets—came to dominate the subject. It was because this theory was so widely 
accepted that a high status was accorded to general equilibrium theory. As Mark Blaug put it, 
“we knew [in the early 1960s] that general equilibrium theory was the last word in theoretical 
elegance, and that input-output analysis and linear programming would soon make it not just 
elegant but operational” (Blaug 1994, 17, emphasis in original). 
2. There has been a change in the relationship between theoretical and empirical work 
but empirical work has not been completely disconnected from theory. 
3. The significant decline is in exclusively theoretical papers.  
As Rodrik (2015, p. 201) has said, 
 
“these days, it is virtually impossible to publish in top journals … in 
development and international economics without including some 
                                                                                                                                                  
dominated by theory. 
9 Conceptions of theory have changed throughout the history of economics. For example, the interwar 
Institutionalists used types of theory that few economists would today recognize as economic theory. They 
included Thorstein Veblen’s evolutionary analysis of the relationship between business and industry and the 
legal-transactional analysis of John Commons. 
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serious empirical analysis. … The standards of the profession now 
require much greater attention to the quality of data, to causal inference 
from evidence and a variety of statistical pitfalls. All in all, this 
empirical turn has been good for the profession.”  
 
However, though there appears to be increasing consensus on there having been an empirical 
turn, our contention is that it is not the right way to characterize what has happened. There 
have certainly been profound changes in attitudes towards empirical work and how to do 
empirical work but there has always been a lot of empirical work. Moreover, theory is still 
important—seven out of twelve Clark medal winners since 2000 were also described as 
theorists.10 Four of them were also described as doing applied or empirical work, and of the 
others, one (Rabin) was described as bringing theory “into closer accord with actual 
behavioral patterns” and another (Acemoglu) was doing work “always motivated by real-
world questions arising when facts are difficult to reconcile with existing theory.” A term that 
has gained wide currency in recent years is “applied theory.”11 This denotes theoretical 
models that are formulated in relation to specific empirical problems. The importance 
attached to “applied theory” and to policy analysis is a clear indication that what has 
happened recently concerns not just empirical work but encompasses theory and policy 
relevance. This suggests that economics has not really gone “from theory to data,” but has 
rather experienced a profound redefinition of the relationship of theoretical to empirical 
work. When combined with the policy-orientation of most economic research, the result has 
been a major change in the discipline. As we will explain, the term applied economics is 
 
10 These include (dates of Clark Medal in parentheses) Matthew Rabin (2001), Daron Acemoglu (2005), Susan 
Athey (2009), Emmanuel Saez (2009), Jonathan Levin (2011), Matt Gentskow (2014) and Yuliy Sannikov 
(2016) 
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problematic (in the same way that the notion of applied science is problematic) but we 
contend that the developments we have described, combined with economists’ widespread 
use of the term “applied” justifies our description of the twenty-first century as the age of the 
applied economist.  
 The term “applied” is ambiguous (see Backhouse and Biddle 2000). “Application” 
can involve tailoring a theory to the study of specific issues through creating a model that is 
relevant to a specific set of circumstances; it can mean using a theory to explain or analyze a 
specific set of data; or it can mean participating in the design of public policies or business 
strategies. Given this, it is helpful to step back from economics and to view history of the 
broader term “applied science.” This is the subject of the paper by Paul Erickson (this 
volume). Erickson explains how the distinction “pure/applied” was developed by natural 
scientists during the nineteenth century and was used as a weapon in the attempt to achieve 
two seemingly irreconcilable goals immediately after the Second World War: preserving the 
independence of scientists in the face of pressures from industrial, military and governmental 
interests; and convincing those in a position to provide financial support that “pure” science 
lay behind many useful inventions and was therefore worth funding. On the other hand, as 
engineers opened graduate programs and sought a more stable position within universities, 
they “embraced the rhetoric of ‘applied science’ to describe their work.” But although it is 
commonplace for scientists to use the rhetoric of pure (or basic) and applied science, the 
distinction is in practice often difficult to sustain. As Erickson explains, the practices of 
scientists, economists as well as natural scientists, do not fall into neat compartments. 
 However, we believe the ambiguity and polysemy of the term “applied” makes it 
better, not worse for our purpose. In accounting for the changes that have taken place in 
                                                                                                                                                  
11 The word is used in Athey and Sannikov’s John Bates Clark citations. See also Diamond (2014). 
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recent economics, which cover transformations in theorizing and policy thinking, we need a 
term that encompasses a larger set of identities and practices than those that come under the 
heading “empirical.” It is important to remember that as the relationships between theoretical, 
empirical and applied work, have changed, so too has the meaning attributed to those terms 
which economists, like natural scientists, have been used because of their rhetorical value.  
As Erickson argues, “application” is often about the ability of a theory to produce innovative 
patterns of collaboration as about its ability to predict or describe. Our focus on the term 
“applied” mirrors economists’ growing, yet often undefined and ambiguous use of the term, 
notably in John Bates Clark citations—one that reflects a constantly changing understanding 
of the relationship between theory and empirical work and of the relationships between 
economists and their clients. 
To sum up, this volume is about how the period in which being a theorist was the 
most prestigious activity for an economist to engage in (a period that in its most extreme 
form turned out to be remarkably short lived) evolved into the current situation in which 
economists take pride in being applied, whether applied theorists or empirical economists 
who tackle problems of policy. This is a complicated story. Economists sometimes claim that 
the changes can be explained as the results of advances in information technology; however, 
as we explain later on, whilst improvements in computer technology were necessary for the 
changes that took place, they are not sufficient to explain what has happened. The 
transformation of the subject played out differently across different fields.  
It is, moreover, a story with parallels in other social sciences. The historian Hunter 
Heyck (2015) has argued that the period from the mid 1950s to the mid 1970s all the social 
sciences exhibited a concern with systems and modeling: there was widespread belief in a 
“universal man” and “an idealization of formal, instrumental reason, epitomized by the 
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development of systematic theory and formal modeling, and by a fascination with procedural 
logic” (Heyck 2015, p. 11). This “high modern social science” as Heyck calls it, went 
through a crisis in the mid 1970s (see also Rodgers 2011). Economists never abandoned 
modeling and the story told here is not a precise fit with Heyck’s, but the parallels are 
sufficient to suggest that the story is a complex one reaching beyond the boundaries of the 
economics discipline. It is one about changes in tools, models and technologies as well as 
about changes in economists’ standards of excellence and how economists’ identity was 
defined, and to find explanations we will likely to have to turn, not just to technology, but to 
the political and social factors such as the problems economists were being asked to solve 
and who was supporting them. Though we take account of other sources, the story we tell is 
based primarily on the papers presented at a conference held in the Center for the History of 
Political Economy at Duke University, on April 1-2, 2016 and included in this volume.12 
 
2. Changing relationships between theoretical and applied 
economics 
 
Understanding the relationship of theory to applied work requires taking a long view. 
Theory may have enjoyed a privileged status in the economists’ pecking order in the 1960s 
but it had not always been that way. In the interwar period, many economists prioritized 
empirical work: empirical work was as prestigious as theory. This was the period when the 
NBER was transforming the statistical knowledge of the American economy and when 
Wesley Mitchell was aiming at a statistical description of the business cycle. It was the age 
 
12 The agenda was set in a paper titled “Becoming Applied: The Transformation of Economics since the 1970s” 
(Backhouse and Cherrier 2014) in which we posed many questions about the last fifty years and how the 
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when economists responded to the Great Depression with empirical analyses of market 
structures and how these might have led to a breakdown in the competitive process (see 
Backhouse 2015). For such economists, scientific rigor meant being grounded in data, 
whether statistical or institutional, not being mathematically rigorous.13  
After two decades in which Institutionalists had challenged abstract theory (for example 
Mitchell’s (1925) argument that the progress of quantitative economics would cause 
economists to lose interest in the type of theory associated with neoclassical economics), the 
quarter century after the Second World War was one in which the centrality of this type of 
economic theory came to be accepted. Institutionalist attitudes had not completely 
disappeared. The author of a report written for the American Economic Association (AEA) 
on graduate education, Harold Bowen (1953, p. 111) deplored the fact that there were 
universities in which students considered economic theory “as a hurdle—something like the 
foreign language requirement—which must be surmounted but which is not considered 
relevant to one’s major interest” in some applied field. However he still wrote that the 
“common core which should bind the profession together … consists primarily of economic 
theory”, attributing skepticism about the relevance of theory to poor teaching (Bowen 1953, 
pp. 42-3). Ninety per cent of professors surveyed believed that economic theory should be 
part of the core graduate curriculum. By the 1950s the leading journals contained a high 
proportion of articles that were either primarily theoretical or in which theory was used as the 
basis for empirical work (Backhouse 1998, p. 91). Two decades later, a report by Nancy 
Ruggles (1970, p. 5) could be even more positive about economic theory: “Economic theory 
provides much of the unity of the discipline. Every economist is trained in economic theory 
and applies its concepts and mechanisms to problems in his own special field.” Micro and 
                                                                                                                                                  
concept of applied economics had been understood during that time. 
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macro theories were coming closer together and both were related to econometrics which was 
permitting theories to be tested. Where direct testing was not possible, perhaps because 
models were too complex to permit “mathematical solutions”, simulation could be used to 
analyze problems such as the effects of changes in tax regimes (Ruggles 1970, pp. 6-7). 
 However, there was resistance to the increasing dominance of theory, which meant 
neoclassical theory based on optimizing agents and, mostly, competitive markets. There were 
intense methodological controversies in the late 1940s and early 1950s (see Backhouse 2003; 
Isaac 2010). A particularly significant controversy erupted when Tjalling Koopmans, Vice-
President of the Cowles Commission and shortly to become its Research Director, criticized 
Measuring Business Cycles (Burns and Mitchell 1945), the final volume in a series of 
statistical studies of the business cycle overseen by Mitchell at the NBER, as “measurement 
without theory” (Koopmans 1947). He argued explicitly that theory was needed to give 
meaning to empirical work. Challenging this, Rutledge Vining (1949), for the NBER, 
countered that this presumed knowledge of the appropriate theory, and that if one did not 
know the appropriate theory, empirical work was needed in order to discover it. In the 1950s 
and 1960s, though there were economists approaching empirical work differently, the 
dominant approach was the one advocated by Koopmans and the Cowles Commission, in 
which utility and profit maximizing models were used to frame hypotheses which were then 
tested against statistical data.14 
 Another controversy that helped define the attitude towards theory that prevailed in 
the 1960s was initiated by Richard Lester (1946). Starting from the gap that existed between 
“marginalist” theories in which firms were presumed to maximize profits, and the theory of 
                                                                                                                                                  
13 See the references in footnote 4 above. 
14 Whether recent developments, such as the use of natural experiments and randomized control trials are in the 
spirit of Vining’s claim that empirical work may be valuable even if no structural model can be specified or bear 
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employment and the business cycle, he appealed for more evidence: “Much more evidence 
must be accumulated before definitive conclusions can be drawn regarding wage-
employment relationships” (Lester 1946, p. 64). The way forward was to accumulate better 
evidence on wage-employment relationships. In contrast, his critics, setting the tone for most 
subsequent work on business behavior, argued, for the primacy of theory: the assumption of 
profit maximizing behavior, and with it certain propositions such as that minimum wages 
must reduce employment. Despite its claim that the theoretical predictions should be tested, 
and his use of NBER methods in his monetary economics, the most prominent response to 
Lester, Milton Friedman’s “Methodology of Positive Economics” (1953) completely ignored 
the evidence Lester adduced against the predictions of marginalist theory and made it clear 
that the assumption of profit maximizing firms was not open to serious question.15 Though 
unanimity was never achieved, the outcome of the controversy was to help establish the 
primacy of profit-maximizing theories of the firm in relation both to non-maximizing theories 
and in relation to empirical work (see Lee 1984; Mongin 1992; Backhouse 2008). 
  Institutional battles were also fought. The first five winners of the Clark medal were 
Paul Samuelson (1947), Kenneth Boulding (1949), Milton Friedman (1951), James Tobin 
(1955), and Kenneth Arrow (1957), all perceived to be theorists.16 In 1958, following a 
complaint from Morris Copeland (1958, 610) that  “purely deductive exercises … offer 
young men prompter and surer professional recognition than does any form of empirical 
research” and that the incentives facing young economists needed to be changed, the AEA 
appointed a committee to investigate changing the rules surrounding the award. The 
                                                                                                                                                  
continuity with the Cowles method is a matter of debate (see Panhans and Singleton, this volume). 
15 Lester’s evidence on the effects of a minimum wage bore a striking similarity to the natural experiment that 
Card and Krueger (1994) were later to use to question the effects of a minimum wage. Because wages were 
initially lower in the South, the national minimum wage imposed in 1940 raised wages more in the South than 
in the North, but employment rose more in the South. 
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committee asked former members of the nominating committee and a sample of young 
economists whether the medal should be discontinued, maintained or supplemented with an 
additional award that would reward applied work (to be named after Mitchell). Most former 
nominating committee members thought that a balance could be struck between theoretical, 
empirical and policy work using the existing award. However, the young economists 
overwhelmingly (thirty two out of thirty five) supported the creation of a new award, and 
complained about the difficulty of getting policy work published in the American Economic 
Review and other top journals. One pointed out that businessmen and the general public were 
recognizing the empirical contributions that economics could make and that the AEA’s 
reward structure needed to catch up. One economist, working on “military, political, social 
and economic intelligence” wrote that “the job of maintaining the Free World will be a lot 
easier and will be done better if we have more data and more empirical research.” However, 
despite the recommendation of the committee, a new award was never established, and the 
Clark medal was continued in its existing form.17 
The 1959 winner was Lawrence Klein and, for the first time, a citation was published, 
noting that Klein “had insisted that theory be grounded in empirical fact” and that he had 
extended Keynesian analysis “empirically as well as theoretically.”18 However, though Klein 
was cited as an empirical economist, the committee perhaps being mindful of the criticisms 
made of the award, his work was firmly in the Cowles Commission mold, in which a priori 
theory was used to identify the relationships to be estimated from the data. The growing 
complexity of the relationship between theory and application was illustrated by the awards 
                                                                                                                                                  
16 The key word in this sentence is “perceived.” Friedman and Tobin had both done very significant empirical 
work but they were not seen by critics of the awards to be empirical workers. 
17 The material is taken from Cherrier and Svorenčík (2016). Source: “American Economic Association 
Temporary Committee on Additional Awards,” folder “Committee on additional award,” Box 61, American 
Economic Association Papers, Duke University. 
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in the 1960s and early 1970s, each of which involved a different relationship between theory 
and application. For example, much of Robert Solow’s work had been theoretical (though 
with some highly cited empirical papers) but the citation (1961) stressed that “the emphasis 
he has placed, not on mathematical or statistical method, but on the economic significance of 
his work, and by his ability to contribute not only to the advancement of economic 
knowledge but also to the formulation of economic policy.”19 Hendrik Houthakker (winner 
1963) engaged in theory that had empirical implications, whilst Zvi Grilliches (winner 1965) 
was cited as “testing hypotheses on the diffusion of innovations” and developing techniques 
for measuring the effects of changes in the quality of inputs.20 In 1971, Dale Jorgenson was 
praised for “the marriage of theory and practice in economics” and in 1973, it was said of 
Franklin Fisher that “his work represents one of the finest examples of the interaction of 
theory and measurement in economics.”21 Empirical work was now receiving ample 
recognition from the AEA but, for all the differences in approach, it was seen as being 
closely linked to theory, with much of this work being in the Cowles Commission mold. 
 There were even rumblings of dissent within the Econometric Society, making it clear 
that objections to the prominence of theory were not the prerogative of those who either did 
not or could not use mathematics. In January 1953, Oskar Morgenstern wrote Alfred Cowles 
suggesting that the Econometric Society Constitution be amended so that candidates for the 
Fellowship be required to “have done some econometric work in the strictest sense” and to be 
“in actual contact with data they have explored and exploited for which purpose they may 
have even developed new methods.” There was considerable support for this proposal, 
                                                                                                                                                  
18 https://www.aeaweb.org/about-aea/honors-awards/bates-clark/lawrence-klein. Accessed October 18, 2016. 
19 https://www.aeaweb.org/about-aea/honors-awards/bates-clark/robert-solow. 
20 https://www.aeaweb.org/about-aea/honors-awards/bates-clark/zvi-griliches. 
21 https://www.aeaweb.org/about-aea/honors-awards/bates-clark/dale-jorgenson; https://www.aeaweb.org/about-
aea/honors-awards/bates-clark/franklin-fisher. 
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stemming in part from a view that Econometrica contained too little empirical material, 
though influential members of the Cowles Commission, including Jacob Marschak and 
Tjalling Koopmans opposed it strongly. They complained that there was insufficient funding 
for fundamental research, by which they meant theory.22  
 The early 1970s saw a spate of Presidential addresses attacking economics for being 
too theoretical and too divorced from reality of which the one by Leontief was the most 
prominent, perhaps because he backed it up with statistical analysis of the leading journals 
and repeated his attack in article in Science (Leontief 1982). Such criticisms came from 
theorists (Hahn 1970) as well as from applied economists (Phelps-Brown 1972). The editor 
of the AER, in a defensive statement of editorial policy, wrote:  
Anyone who has read the American Economic Review for the last 
twenty-five years realizes that great changes have taken place in the 
subject matter and methodology of economic research. Articles on 
mathematical economics and the finer points of economic theory 
occupy a much more prominent place than ever before, while articles of 
a more empirical, policy-oriented, or problem-solving character seem to 
appear less frequently. (Borts 1972, p. 764) 
He affirmed that this was not the result of any editorial preference for mathematical or 
theoretical articles. It is perhaps ironical that these criticisms were happening at just the time 
that the AEA was selecting a series of economics who, the Clark medal citations claimed, 
were proving the relevance of theory to applied work. To the citations of Jorgenson and 
Fisher, mentioned earlier, could be added Daniel McFadden (winner 1975), described as  
 
22 Morgenstern to Cowles, June 9, 1953; R.L. Cardwell to Fellows of the Econometric Society, September 18, 
1953. Folder “Econometric Socierty, 1948-1952” and “Econometric Society, 1952,” Box 39, Morgenstern 
Papers, Rubinstein Library, Duke University.  
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“one of the most complete economists of his generation” (“complete” covering theory, 
econometrics and empirical studies) and Martin Feldstein (winner 1977) whose work spanned 
“a multidimensional spectrum embracing concrete policy issues, applied econometrics, 
statistical methods for econometrics, and economic theory.”23 
 The way empirical work was informed with theoretical frameworks is shown in a very 
detailed bibliographic study of labor economics, covering the period 1965-83 (Stafford 1986, 
Table 7.2, p. 392). This showed that the proportion of theoretical papers had roughly doubled 
from 1965-9 to 1980-3. However, the author Frank Stafford argued that the most significant 
changes was the near-doubling of the proportion of empirical papers that contained a 
“meaningful” theoretical section (a section based on standard theory) from 17% in 1965-9 to 
between 33% and 36% for the rest of the sample period. Even in 1980-3, when the proportion 
was lowest, 71% of papers were empirical, with or without a theoretical basis. In short, labor 
economics was becoming more theoretical, but much of that theory was informing empirical 
work; in other cases it was still driven by empirical problems. Stafford estimated that around 
half the purely theoretical papers had empirical potential even if no empirical work was 
reported. 
 In that there was a focus on aggregate time-series data rather than cross-section and 
panel data on individuals, macroeconomists used techniques different from those generally 
used in labor economics but, as in labor economics, theory was dominant. The dominant 
theme in macroeconomics in the 1980s and 1990s was the need for a certain type of 
microfoundations.24 This was done in the belief that the use of explicitly stochastic 
 
23 https://www.aeaweb.org/about-aea/honors-awards/bates-clark/daniel-mcfadden; 
https://www.aeaweb.org/about-aea/honors-awards/bates-clark/martin-feldstein. 
24 “Microfoundations” is put in quotation marks to indicate that it was understood in a very specific way, 
typically involving formal modeling of optimizing, infinitely-far sighted representative agents. This was, of 
course, a very narrow view of microfoundations (see Hoover 2012). 
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theoretical models made it possible to integrate theory and econometric work in a way not 
previously possible.25 However, despite the importance of theory, macroeconomics remained 
a field in which applied and theoretical work coexisted: much effort was devoted to the 
development of new empirical techniques and to the analysis of data; and policy concerns 
were never far away. As a leading protagonist put it, “major changes in the analysis and 
practice of monetary policy over the years 1973-98 [can be attributed to] a combination of 
theoretical and empirical influences” (McCallum 2000, p. 135, emphasis added). 
 Thus, in 1988, when the Journal of Economic Literature initiated a major revision of 
the codes that it used to classify economics, the decision was taken to integrate theory and 
applied work. As editor John Pencavel put it, “good research in economics is a blend of 
theory and empirical work” (Cherrier 2017). Policy work was added on the assumption that 
most of what economists produced was ultimately policy oriented. Shortly afterwards, when 
honoring 1993 Clark medal winner Lawrence Summers, the AEA could refer to “a 
remarkable resurgence of empirical economics over the past decade” claiming that “this 
research has restored the primacy of actual economies over abstract models in much of 
economic thinking.”26 Describing Summers as someone whose influence had “permeated all 
areas of applied economics,” the citation claimed that “his work has inspired a new 
generation of economists […] who are now reconstructing the empirical foundations of the 
discipline.” By now the AEA was honoring a mixture of theoretical and applied economists 
and, perhaps most significantly, many economists who were combining theoretical and 
empirical work. 
 
25 No comment is made on whether this belief was justified. The argument against it is that the relationship 
between theoretical and empirical macroeconomics had always been close. 
26 https://www.aeaweb.org/about-aea/honors-awards/bates-clark/lawrence-summers, accessed October 20, 2016. 
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 However, though there might appear to have emerged an equilibrium in which theory 
and applied work went together, the situation did not last, at least in microeconomics (DSGE 
modeling continued to dominate macroeconomics, even after the global financial crisis of 
2007-8). The development of new techniques associated with behavioral and experimental 
economics, and the use of “quasi-experimental” methods transformed parts of the subject (the 
so-called “empirical turn” discussed above). Though structural econometrics remained an 
active field, there was a reorientation of the relationship between theory and applied work. 
The Cowles structural econometrics program involved combining theory and empirical work, 
but new approaches to econometric work moved away from testing theory to finding ways to 
identify effects in the data, often using large and previously unexplored data sets, as 
described in the quotation from Deaton at the start of this paper. The question with which this 
volume is concerned is how and why this transition took place. 
 
3. New modeling strategies, new data, new technologies 
 
 A first explanation for the applied turn in economics is the rise of new and diverse 
techniques to confront models with data. In the early 1980s, econometrics went through a 
period of self-examination, from David Hendry’s (1980) likening of certain econometric 
practices to alchemy to Leamer’s (1983) view that the “con” needed to be taken out of 
econometrics. It was widely believed in the 1970s and early 1980s that econometric methods 
could be used to produce whatever results the investigator wanted to find. Spurred on by this, 
new macroeconometric techniques (vector autoregressive models (VARs), Bayesian 
estimation, calibration) developed in the 1970s were spread alongside the new models they 
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were used to estimate (by Sims, Kydland, Prescott, Sargent and others).27 Another technique 
that was increasingly being used was experimental economics. The Economic Science 
Association was founded in 1986, and such methods were recognized by the award of the 
Nobel Memorial Prize to Daniel Kahneman and Vernon Smith in 2002. Economists often 
focus on experiments as a device to test theory, as when experiments were used to evaluate 
whether subjects make choices consistent with the assumptions of rationality but, as 
Svorenčík (2015, 15) explains, experimental economists pushed a more fundamental 
redefinition of the relationships between theory and data: “by creating data that were 
specifically produced to satisfy conditions set by theory in controlled environments that were 
capable of being reproduced and repeated, [experimentalists] sought […] to turn 
experimental data into a trustworthy partner of economic theory. This was in no sense a 
surrender of data to the needs of theory. The goal was to elevate data from their denigrated 
position, acquired in postwar economics, and put them on the same footing as theory.”  
 The period when experimental economics was becoming firmly established coincides 
with the development of a different set of techniques, the history of which is documented by 
Panhans and Singleton (this volume). They argue that the development of research design, 
going under the general heading of “quasi-experimental” methods, brought about a sea 
change in the relations between theory and empirical work, emancipating the latter from the 
former. In the 1970s and 1980s, economists were using data to test and operationalize 
economic theory (see Stafford 1986). In contrast, in the 1990s economists were turning away 
from structural econometrics, which involves formulating a fully specified probability model 
for the problem under consideration, and using simpler methods to identify effects of interest. 
They date the change to a paper by Joshua Angrist and Karl Krueger (1991), which makes 
 
27 See De Vroey (2015). 
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use of the fact that compulsory schooling laws mean that the date in which children are born 
can determine the number of years’ schooling they get, dividing otherwise identical groups of 
children into “control” and “treatment” groups. The analysis can be done without specifying 
any optimization problem or structural model. The institutional feature that makes the 
experiment possible comes from outside the model. In many cases, the questions that 
economists try to answer with such methods are not even linked to economic theory. It is, 
Panhans and Singleton claim, a move from models to methods, The use of such methods, 
they write, has changed teaching and, institutionalized in schools of public policy and public 
health, has influenced the way economists interact with other disciplines.  
  Other techniques blurred the demarcation between theory and applied work by 
constructing real-world economic objects rather than studying them. That was the case of the 
combination of experimental economics and mechanism design described in Lee (2016) or 
Nik-Khah (2008) or of financial economics (see MacKenzie (2006) and Mehrling (2005)). 
Contingent Valuation is yet another technique in which economic values are constructed 
rather than observed. In his historical account of the development and controversies 
surrounding contingent valuation, Spencer Banzhaf (this volume) explains that “a CV 
[contingent valuation] survey literally speaks economic values into being,” which, like 
experimental economics, calls into question traditional linear and deductive relationships 
between theoretical and empirical work. Initially developed to give value to recreational and 
environmental public goods for which no market exists, it was aimed at measuring a specific 
theoretical object, namely “willingness to pay.” The idea was to design a survey whereby 
economic agents would participate in a hypothetical but credible market. The resulting bids 
they were asked to make would subsequently be used as inputs into cost-benefit analysis. As 
observed bid came to diverge with what the theory of rational economic behavior predicted, 
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economists reacted differently, thereby showing diverging conceptions of applied work. For 
proponents of the method, careful survey designed ensured that the method actually created 
rational valuations. For others, like Daniel Kahneman, the anomalies observed disqualified 
the standard theory of individual behavior and confirmed his prospect theory. For 
experimental economists like Vernon Smith or Charles Plott, and econometricians among 
them Jerry Hausman, the whole method did not live up to econometric standards and was 
flawed.  
A second explanation for the recent applied turn is the “data revolution” (Einav and 
Levin 2013). Though the recent explosion of real-time large scale multi-variable digital 
databases is mind-boggling and has the allure of a revolution, the availability of economic 
data has also evolved constantly since the Second World War.28 Notable events included new 
microeconomic surveys that were started in the 1960s (the Panel Survey on Income 
Dynamics) and the 1970s (the National Longitudinal Survey). Additionally, administrative 
databases were increasingly opened for research. The availability of tax data, for instance, 
transformed public economics. A decade later, technological advanced allowed a redefinition 
of the information architecture of financial markets (see Pardo-Guerra 2010), and asset 
prices, as well as a range of business data (credit card information, etc.), could be recorded in 
real-time. The development of digital markets and economists’ increased interest in 
generating their own data eventually generated new large databases on a wide range of 
microeconomic variables.  
Rather than a revolution in the 1980s, 1990s or 2010s, the history of economics 
therefore seems one of constant adjustment to new types of data. The historical record belies 
 
28 There is a large literature on the making of public statistics (see Porter 1996), such as national accounting (see 
the bibliography at https://asociologist.com/national-income-bibliography/) and the cost of living indexes 
produced by the BLS (Stapleford 2009). 
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Liran Einav and Jonathan Levin’s  (2014, p. 716) statement that “even 15 or 20 years ago, 
interesting and unstudied data sets were a scarce resource.” In 1970, for instance, Dale 
Jorgenson (1970, p.61) explained that  “the database for econometric research is expanding 
much more rapidly than econometric research itself. National accounts and interindustry 
transactions data are now available for a large number of countries. Survey data on all aspects 
of economic behavior are gradually becoming incorporated into regular economic reporting. 
Censuses of economic activity are becoming more frequent and more detailed. Financial data 
related to securities market are increasing in reliability, scope and availability.” In the same 
volume, Guy Orcutt (1970, 67-69), the architect of economic simulation, explained that the 
current issue was that “the enormous body of data to work with” was “inappropriate” for 
scientific use because the economist was not controlling data collection. With a very different 
qualitative and quantitative situation, they were making the same statements and issuing the 
same complaints as today.  
This dramatic improvement in data collection and storage has been enabled by the 
improvement in computer technology. Usually seen as the single most important factor 
behind the applied turn, the computer has affected much more than just economic data. This 
is undoubtedly important—improvements in computing and the new sources of data that they 
have made possible have clearly been necessary for the changes that have taken place in 
applied work—but they are not sufficient to explain what has happened. Backhouse and 
Cherrier (this volume) make this point. The rise of computers could have affected economics 
in many different ways, and the evolution that took place was the result not just of hardware 
availability but of the way economists chose to respond to the opportunities facing them. The 
use of computers to do things that economists already wanted to do (e.g. invert the large 
matrices in input-output models) is part of the story, but more important was the development 
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of new techniques and methods as economists saw the potential to do things they had not 
done before. Software, as important as hardware, was developed by economists in response 
to their ideas about how economics needed to be done. It was not inevitable that computers 
would favor empirical work over theory: indeed, a major use of computers was simulation, a 
technique (or perhaps family of techniques) that blurred the distinction between theory and 
applied work.29 
 That computerization was far from sufficient to ensure the success of applied 
approaches is shown by the fate of computable general equilibrium (CGE) or applied general 
equilibrium (AGE) modeling, the history of which is covered by Ballard and Johnson (this 
volume). They use the work of Herbert Scarf, who provided algorithms for finding the 
solutions to general equilibrium systems, whose existence had been proved by Lionel 
McKenzie, Kenneth Arrow and Gerard Debreu, to reinforce the point made by Backhouse 
and Cherrier, that simulations blurred the distinction between theory and application. Ballard 
and Johnson distinguish several types of applied general equilibrium model: 
 
• Descendants of the Johanson model (discussed by Halsmayer this volume)—highly 
detailed models focusing on policy analysis, often associated with governments or 
international organizations, many of which tackle policy problems related to 
international trade; 
• Jorgenson-style models—smaller, though getting larger, and based on parameters 
many of which are the result of econometric estimation; 
• Models in the tradition of Scarf—starting from Arrow and Debreu, these involve 
specified functional forms, often with coefficients established through calibration. 
 
29 See for instance Galison’s (1996) account of how simulations created a “trading zone” between theory and 
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These approaches, largely distinct up to that point, were brought together at a conference in 
1981, after which there was a massive increase in the literature and in the use of such models. 
 Though the availability of large-scale computing was crucial to the development of 
applied general equilibrium models, as with macroeconometric models of the same period, 
the lack of standard procedures for coding and differences in operating systems meant that 
there were great problems in replicating results. Models were criticized as being “black 
boxes” of dubious value. The response was the development and increasing use of 
standardized software packages. Standardization was also assisted by the emergence of the 
World Bank and the Center of Policy Studies at Monash University as the main centers of 
applied general equilibrium modeling. Becoming a more routine technique, along with other 
explanations proposed by Ballard and Johnson, may help explain why from the 1990s, 
applied general equilibrium modeling came increasingly to be confined to field journals. 
Conversely, the implementation of some of the quasi-experimental techniques mentioned in 
Panhans and Singleton (this volume), notably randomized control trials, made few demanded 
little computational power beyond what had been able a decade or more earlier. 
Throughout the postwar era, economists have repeatedly claimed that the availability 
of new data sets and the computing power to analyze them have transformed certain fields.30 
For example, in his 1964 AEA presidential address, George Stigler (1964, p. 16) claimed that 
“the age of quantification is now full upon us. We are armed with a bulging arsenal of 
techniques of quantitative analysis, and of a power – as compared to untrained common 
sense- comparable to the displacement of archers by cannon […] The desire to measure 
                                                                                                                                                  
applied work in physics.  
30 For example, Ruggles (1970, pp. 6-7) referred to the effects of survey research methods and the ability of 
computers to process large quantities of data. Stafford (1986) also draws attention to the importance of new 
sources of data in the early 1980s. Claims that computerization was dramatically transforming economics were 
made by Leontief in the 1940s, econometricians in the 1960s, RAND alumni in the 1970s, and by statisticians in 
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economic phenomena is now in the ascendent […] It is a scientific revolution of the very first 
magnitude.” Changes in the availability of data and the way data were used were not only 
more frequent than is consistent with the story of a recent “revolution,” and they were more 
diverse across modeling strategies, fields and sites than is usually acknowledged (see Section 
4 below). 
However, in some fields, data remained a constraint on what could be achieved. In her 
history of the Norwegian multi-sectorial growth model, Verena Halsmayer (this volume) 
shows that Leif Johansen began by writing down a one-sector growth model which provided 
“binding rules” for the larger models subsequently implemented during the 1960s. It imposed 
requirements of balanced macroeconomic accounting, and working with a neoclassical 
production function with long term equilibrium growth values. It therefore presented “the 
economy” as a system of sectors following what Johansson called development path, that is 
one that was efficiently managed though not necessarily balanced because sectors might be 
growing at different rates. At the same time, Halsmayer highlights the tradeoffs between 
theoretical rigor and the need to accommodate the type of public data Norway produced 
(input-output data were developed very early, enabling the modeling of growth in several 
sectors) and the local computing capacities. Johansen simply could not increase the 
sophistication of his growth models in the way he wanted.  
The relationship between theoretical and empirical work underpinning the contingent 
value method was a different one, and the practice of experimentalists described by Andrej 
Svorenčík (this volume) mixed laboratory experiments, field observation of how committees 
made decisions and using historical records of past allocations made by such committees. 
The history of development economics in the past 50 years is also one of unstable 
                                                                                                                                                  
the 1990s (see Cherrier and Backhouse, this volume).  
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relationships between theoretical and applied work. Michele Alacevich (this volume) tells 
how, starting from a belief that neoclassical theory was largely irrelevant for understanding 
the problems of developing economies, development economists ended up believing that 
policy prescriptions derived from field learning and inductive analysis had failed. From the 
1960s onward, therefore, the field was thus largely rebuilt through the import of cost-benefit 
analysis, input-output analysis and the standard theory of international trade. At the same 
time, the field retained a strong focus on understanding institutions, though this worked out 
very differently in the work of Albert Hirschman, Douglas North and Lance Taylor. 
Development also turned to concepts such as multiple equilibrium, imperfect markets and 
efficiency-wages, at one point becoming highly theoretical. Development economics was one 
of the fields in which randomized control trials emerged, though it was much challenged 
from within.  
There was therefore great variety in the relationship between modeling strategies, data 
and technologies. In addition, the growing use of simulations (for example, agent-based 
modeling), contributed to a blurring of the distinction between theory and application. 
However, in all the stories outlined in this volume, the diversity of applied economics 
practices the result not only of idiosyncratic combinations of modeling techniques, datasets, 
software and hardware: it was also a consequence of the variety of sites, old and new, where 
applied economics was practiced, and the changing demands patrons and clients were 
imposing upon economists. This, of course is connected to the policy orientation of the 
applied turn.  
 
4. The influence of patrons and clients of economics in these 
transformations 
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Stigler titled his 1964 AEA Presidential Address, “The Economist and the State”, 
writing  “our expanding theoretical and empirical studies will inevitably and irresistibly enter 
into the subject of public policy, and we shall develop a body of knowledge essential to 
intelligent policy formulation.” The social and political context of this address has been 
extensively researched already.31 Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, a series of crises, social 
ills and resulting unrest unfolded: pollution, the urban crisis and the rise of crime, the Civil 
Right movement, the Vietnam War, the energy crisis, the perceived rise of poverty, and 
stagflation. The resulting War on Poverty launched by Lyndon B. Johnson, and the associated 
sprawling legislation designed to improve social policies, brought all sorts of policy experts, 
including economists, to the government. Beginning in the 1970s and 1980s, governments 
however gradually moved towards policies involving deregulation. Economists were 
involved in this process but their input was mediated by layers of bureaucracy and public 
decision-making; the constraints under which economists operated differed across countries 
and across agencies and changed constantly (see papers by Berman, Halsmayer and 
Svorenčík, this volume).  
The funding structure for economics was changing as well. Though private 
foundations, such the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, continued to fund the social 
sciences their contribution was increasingly topped by that of the US government (Heyck 
2006, Table 3, p. 430). There was also a diversification in the sites where economic research 
was conducted. A crucial site for empirical research since the 1920s, the NBER was 
thoroughly restructured by Martin Feldstein with the explicit purpose of improving empirical 
work in microeconomics—introducing more theory-informed microeconomics (Feldstein 
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2002). Alongside traditional independent research institutes like Brookings, new ones 
emerged, such as RAND (supported by the US Air Force, but developing close links with 
Ford and changing the direction of its research in the 1960s) and Resources for the Future 
(see Banzhaf, this volume), also supported by Ford.  International organization such as the 
IMF or the World Bank (re)opened or enlarged their research departments, and central banks 
hired many economists.32 Economists had testified before Congress for decades, but they 
were increasingly used as expert witnesses in court as well.33 In addition, the spread of 
computing and associated techniques radically transformed business models, and made 
economic expertise on market analysis and market creation even more relevant. The papers 
presented in this volume therefore described how economics was practiced in a variety of 
sites, and though a common feature is the academicization of extra-academic bodies, they 
also highlight how economists were faced with various, sometimes contradictory demands, 
creating new ways of doing “applied” work and additional layers of complexity in the 
relationships of these practices to theoretical work.  
A first example is how macromodeling in Norway during the 1960s and 1970s shaped 
and was shaped by public demands for planning. Halsmayer (this volume), explains that “as 
an artifact, it [Johanson’s model] bears traces of previous knowledge but, due to its new 
shape and material, it provided a new reification of the economy, opened up a new way of 
seeing this entity, and nurtured specific forms of actions to steer it” (p. **). The lines between 
                                                                                                                                                  
31 See Popp Berman (this volume), for a summary and bibliography of the history research on this period.  
32 See Coats 1986. The role of the World Bank in the rise of the applied economists in mentioned in Ballard and 
Johnson (this volume) and is the topic of Alacevich (this volume). On the IMF, see Chwieroth 2010 
(http://press.princeton.edu/titles/9087.html). That the number of economists with PhDs  sitting on the Federal 
Open Market Committee exploded after the 1960s is explained by Justin Fox here: https://hbr.org/2014/02/how-
economics-phds-took-over-the-federal-reserve.  There were similar developments in other countries (see Coats 
1981, 2000, Fourcade 2009). 
33 See Banzhaf, this volume, as well as Maas and Svorenčík (2017) on the Exxon-Valdez case. For a history of 
how game theory came to be used in antitrust and industrial relations cases, see Giocoli (2013). A broader 
account of how economists increasingly interacted with law scholars and professionals can be found in Mercuro 
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theory and application, she contends, become blurred when economic theory and data come 
together in the context of not only available mathematical techniques and computer 
technology but also “institutional arrangements, the aims and hopes of economic planning, 
images and visions of ‘the economy’” (p. **). Computer modeling could not be separated 
from the administrative apparatus for planning: the epistemic authority of the model made 
planning possible, and at the same time, the planning process lent further authority to the 
model. This is significant for our conceptualization of what happened to economics in that 
“macroeconomic planning” ceased to be thinking about goals and aims, but came to comprise 
methods and techniques that were conceived independently of the political setting. It survived 
political changes. Planning became an organizational task that could be represented in terms 
of flow-charts reminiscent of cybernetic systems. Even office space was reorganized to 
accommodate how the model worked, with model construction and national accounting units 
sharing a floor, and new personnel recruited to handle the computer infrastructure and devise 
the visuals necessary to communicate the model’s predictions to decision-makers.  
 In the same period, policy regimes underwent gradual changes in the United States. 
Though the consensus is to characterize this change as a move toward deregulation, Elizabeth 
Popp Berman (this volume) shows that, as in Norway, this was a complex process in which 
policy goals beget new forms of expertise, themselves engendering new institutional layers of 
governmental consultancy and decision-making. The indirect influence of these bureaucratic 
offices extended far beyond the president who had set them up and facilitated the flow of 
ideas between academia and the world of policy. It was not merely a matter of interventionist 
Keynesian economists being displaced by neoliberals opposed to intervention.  
                                                                                                                                                  
and Medema (2006). 
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 The key development came under Gerald Ford and involved deregulating industries in 
the context of trying to reduce inflation (economists who were consulted did not agree that it 
would achieve this goal, but most could nonetheless agree that deregulation would be 
beneficial). Deregulation was seen as the government’s contribution towards disinflation, and 
those industrial organization scholars specializing in the topic gradually supplanted the 
system analysts previously in charge of implementing the Planning-Programming-Budgeting 
System. Concern then spread to social regulation—to estimating the costs and benefits of 
regulations relating to the environment, health and safety at work, or to equal opportunities—
where the emphasis was not on removing regulation but on balancing benefits and costs. This 
increased dramatically during the Carter administration and, paradoxically, despite the anti-
analytical bias of the Reagan administration, it was then institutionalized through an 
executive order making cost-benefit analysis of regulation compulsory. This fed back into 
academia as agencies commissioned studies to quantify the benefits of regulation.  
Berman concludes that applying economics did not just mean applying specific 
models but the use of an economic way of reasoning and the creation of institutional 
channels, such as the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, through which such 
reasoning could spread. This is what happened in the 1970s, establishing the context for 
many of the developments that Macmillan (2003) describes as “reinventing the bazaar.” One 
economic tool nevertheless stand out in this as well as many papers in the volume, namely 
cost-benefit analysis. Banzhaf (2009) has already narrated the water resource management 
origins of the techniques and has explained that although rooted in welfare theory, 
applications of the techniques generated substantial debates among environmental 
economists.  
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Contingent valuation likewise derived from the need to input values for non-market 
goods into cost-benefit equations, and Banzhaf (this volume) as well as Maas and Svorenčík 
(2016) all show that as the tool was endorsed by courts, it generated an increasing amount of 
controversy. Debates already existed regarding the theoretical foundations of the objects 
surveys were measuring, but faced with the contingent valuation of the environmental 
damages causes by the 1989 Alaska oil spill, Exxon-Valdez decided to fund research aimed 
at demonstrating that the whole method was flawed. Surveys were organized, showing 
problems with embedding, scope insensitivity and differences between willingness to pay and 
willingness to accept. Those economists who rejected contingent valuation, from Plott and 
Smith to Hausman and Diamond and those who endorsed it, Randall and Haneman, therefore 
exhibited diverging epistemological postures regarding what counted as good applications, as 
did various patrons. The blue ribbon panel in charge of evaluating contingent valuation, 
which included Kenneth Arrow, Robert Solow, Edward Leamer and Roy Radner,  concluded 
that contingent valuation was hardly “a clean application of economic theory; it is messy, but 
good enough for government work,” Banzhaf concludes. This speaks to the kind of tradeoffs 
economists make in applying their tools to policy issues.  
Since its inception, cost-benefit analysis has been tied to the need for ex-ante and ex-
post policy evaluation. When development economists endorsed the neoclassical framework 
beginning in the 1960s, Alacevich (this volume) explains, one of their first endeavors was to 
adapt cost-benefit analysis tools to the evaluation of industrial policies in developing 
countries. Yet, the growing demands for such expertise during the 1960s and 1970s also 
induced economists to develop alternative tools and models to evaluate policies. For instance, 
it pushed Heather Ross, then a Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) graduate 
student, to undertake with Princeton’s William Baumol and Albert Rees a large randomized 
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social experiment to test negative income tax in New Jersey and Pennsylvania. The 
motivation to undertake experiment throughout the 70s and 80s was not so much to emulate 
medical science, but to allow the evaluation of policies on pilot projects. Daniel Breslau 
(1997) likewise shows that, when faced with the task of evaluating job training programmes 
in the 1980s, those researchers hired by the government again relied on social 
experimentation, while academic labour economists favored structural econometrics. As 
Panhans and Singleton (this volume) remind us, the unification of what counts as a “credible” 
method for the identification of a policy’s effects was achieved under the influence of 
economists such as Orley Ashenfelter, who, as an academic, was willing to participate in the 
development and promotion of the “clean” identification strategy offered by difference-in-
differences, also understood, as former Director of the Office of Evaluation at the U.S. 
Department of Labor,  that it would be considered “credible” by policy-makers. In that sense, 
both the demands of policy-makers and the institutional structures which mediated them 
influenced the development of new tools in economics.  
The deregulatory movement in the United-States also fostered, if not the 
development, at least the spread of other tools, such as experiments. Experimental economists 
were asked to devise and test mechanisms to regulate the price of public television 
broadcasts, natural gas or waterways transportation. As recounted by Svorenčík (this 
volume), the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 resulted in the prospect that a growing number 
of new entrants would soon increase the shortage of airports take-off and landing slots. It was 
in this context that David Grether, Marc Isaac and Charles Plott were asked to propose new 
schemes to allocate slots. To provide policy recommendations it was necessary to move back 
and forth between experiments, theory, non-experimental evidence, and observations of the 
target phenomena. Though slot auctions were recommended very early, partly due to 
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unexpected events, such as Reagan’s sacking of striking air traffic controllers, dramatically 
increasing the number of airports with slot limitations, it was only in 2010 that such an 
auction took place. The story of the rise of the use of experiments in solving the problem of 
how to allocate airport slots was primarily a client-driven problem.  
The influence of Reagan’s policies on ways to practice applied economics was also 
felt in more indirect ways, notably through the National Science Foundation (NSF). Though 
NSF’s economic funding remained minimal throughout the 1960s, it climbed substantially 
only after the establishment of the Research Applied to National Needs office in the early 
1970s. Tiago Mata and Tom Scheiding (2012), explain that Research Applied to National 
Needs office funded research on social indicators, data and evaluation methods for welfare 
programs. It however closed in 1977 after Herbert Simon issued a report emphasizing that the 
applied research funded was “highly variable in quality and, on the average, not impressive.” 
The NSF continued to fund research in econometric forecasting, game theory, 
experimentation and development of longitudinal data sets, but in 1981, Reagan made plan to 
slash the Social Sciences NSF budget by 75%, forcing economists to spell out the social and 
policy benefits of their work more clearly. Lobbying was intense and difficult. Kyu Sang Lee 
(2016) relates how the market organization working group, led by Stanley Reiter, singled out 
a recent experiment involving the Walker mechanism for allocation of a public good as the 
most promising example of policy-relevant economic research. Lawrence Klein, Kenneth 
Arrow and Zvi Griliches were asked to testify before the House of Representatives. The first 
highlighted the benefits of his macroeconometric models for the information industry, the 
second explained that economic tools were badly needed at a time when rising inflation and 
decreasing productivity needed remedy. The NSF requirement that “policy benefits” be 
emphasized in grant application may have encouraged, if not the substantive development of 
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applied economics, at least the kind of rhetorical habit discussed by Erickson (this volume), 
which may have in turn contributed to transform economists’ identity.  
All this suggests that the turn to applied economics, which involved changes in both 
economists’ practices and their perception of their identity, was shaped, to some extent, by 
policy demands and the institutions which mediated them. Alacevich (this volume) shows 
that non-governmental patrons were equally able to influence the form taken by applied 
economics in other fields. The kind of inductive and field-based knowledge promoted by 
development economists such as Albert Hirschman was largely nurtured within the World 
Bank, but by the end of the 1950s, the institution’s top officials nevertheless found the 
generalizations offered too theoretical and the research department was closed. When social 
research were brought back to the bank in the late 1960s, it was under the guise of a 
programming and budgeting department set up by Robert McNamara. Its focus had therefore 
evolved into adapting the tools of cost-benefit analysis to developing economies, and, under 
Hollis Chenery, those were augmented by input-output analysts, linear programmers and 
computable general equilibrium models. By the turn of the twenty first century, the World 
Bank research department had evolved into a major player in the field. Because its task was 
development assistance rather than the mere production of knowledge, the notion that 
knowledge on development emerge from field work remained, creating a permanent tension 
toward the import of tools and abstract models and the academicization of its research 
department.   
 
 
5. Conclusion: The Age of the Applied Economist 
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The 1950s and 1960s could be described as the age of the economic theorist. Unlike in the 
pluralist interwar period in which Institutionalism was strong, economic theory had become 
the property of a younger generation who had a more rigorous training in mathematics than 
their elders. There was much applied work being done—it is probably safe to say that the vast 
majority of economics was applied in some way—and, as computers and specialist software 
packages gradually overcame the barriers to large-scale calculations, econometric work was 
increasing in quantity and in sophistication. However, theory was prominent in the leading 
journals and was increasingly structuring the way economists thought about economic 
problems. As one observer noted, the tribe’s priestly caste comprised the mathematical 
economists (Leijonhufvud 1973, p. 329), and chief among them were general equilibrium 
theorists.  
 As we have shown, the situation gradually changed, as the development of new 
techniques and new sources of data made it possible to derive results which economists 
considered more robust. However, for many years, economic theory retained its primacy. 
Applied work was perceived to need a theoretical basis, with econometrics being used to test 
formally specified theoretical hypotheses. Several fields, such as development and public 
economics, were reshaped around the neoclassical theoretical core. But the 1970s were also a 
period in which models of individual rational decision were applied to a new set of problems 
previously thought outside the boundaries of economics, from health to education, 
international relations, political behavior and law, family, marriage, crime, discrimination, 
prostitution, and drug dealing. These endeavors were largely encouraged though not created 
by Johnson’s need for rational social policy tools. Part of them fall under what is usually 
called “economic imperialism,” the title of a textbook Gordon Tullock published in 1972.34 
 
34 See for instance Medema 2000 and Fleury 2010 on the communities of scientists inside and outside 
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Four years later, Gary Becker, the initiator of this current of analysis, published a synthesis 
under the equally telling title of The Economic Approach to Human Behavior (1978).  
 But at the same time, the turn to game theory and the development of theories of 
imperfect and asymmetric information was greatly expanding the theoretical toolkit available 
to economists, providing formal theories of phenomena about which economists had 
previously been able to speak only informally. As this happened, the role of theory changed. 
No longer was it possible to hope for a single all-encompassing general theory: instead the 
best economists could hope for was a range of theories each of which could be used in a 
different set of circumstances. This is the background to the increased use of the term 
“applied theory.” The growing and complex ties with policy-makers and a variety of clients 
also made it harder for theory to be applied in a standardized way. As most papers in this 
volume show, public and private demands alike pushed economists to tailor theories and 
tools to specific uses, profoundly changing them in the process, sometimes even disregarding 
them altogether in favor of survey-based methods or new techniques such as field 
experiments. Understanding more specifically how theoretical models were tied to specific 
application and empirical work across different field through researching field history is still 
a huge task ahead for historians. Further work is also needed to understand changes in the 
relationship between theory and application in macroeconomics.   
 In the 1990s there emerged new ways of doing applied microeconomics, in that quasi-
experimental methods made it possible to do convincing empirical work independently of 
economic theory. This affected fields where extensive data were available, or could be 
generated, on individuals: labor, household behavior and development. But this was only one 
dimension of the rise to prominence of applied economics. As governments turned towards 
                                                                                                                                                  
economics who spread these tools to the analysis of discrimination and poverty, the key role played by Becker, 
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market solutions to economic problems, from the allocation of airport slots to the right to 
emit pollutants into the atmosphere, the scope for applied work increased. Even technically 
inclined game theorists could find themselves doing applied work, contributing further to the 
increased currency of the term “applied theory.” The “new economy” of the “weightless” 
world posed problems that prompted technological giants such as Microsoft and Google to 
turn to economists. Their work could involve the new-style theory-free empirical work but it 
could also involve theory and simulations. Algorithms could be developed to solve problems 
formulated theoretically as much as ones involving statistical data. It had become the age of 
the applied economist. 
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